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Abstract 
This article aims to investigate the legal and political evolution of the institution of Conditional 
release in Romania between 2000 and 2019 with a special focus on the abrupt changes during the 
mentioned period. The aim of this research consists in bringing together the redefining of the 
regulatory framework of Conditional release in relation to the dynamic political context and 
personal strategies used by the right-holder of individual liberation. Two important episodes need 
to be recalled for the redefinition of this concept: the establishment of the National Anticorruption 
Directorate; and the reform of criminal legislation, after Romania’s accession to the European 
Union. The general objective is to explain and understand the different stages in which liberation 
committees and courts of law have made use of the prerogative of dispensing conditional release, 
given the social role that the complementary institution of Conditional release within the 
institutional, territorial and functional scheme of the rule of law. I will show that amendments to 
criminal law, along with changes in court practice, have led to a reduction in the level of 
consistency between the decisions of the liberation committees and courts of law. Different 
legitimating strategies used by right holders are the main unexpected result of this research, as 
restrictive legal provisions apply to both decision levels. 
 
Keywords: Conditional release, redefining, criminal legislation, overcrowding, Romania. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Conditional release has been defined in penal law doctrine and precedents 
as being at the same time a way of individualizing punishment and an 
alternative to imprisonment.
1
 Early release is based on the principles of 
humanism, which lay the foundation of criminal law and criminal procedure 
                                               
*  Vladimir-Adrian Costea is a PhD student of Political Science at the Faculty of Political 
Science, University of Bucharest. His doctoral thesis focuses on the evolution of the 
clemency measures in the post-communist Romanian space, in relation to the evolution of 
the overcrowding of prisons, under the PhD supervisor Prof. Univ. Dr. Georgeta Ghebrea 
(costea.vladimir-adrian@fspub.unibuc.ro). 
1  See Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation. Intermediate 
Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System (New York and Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
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law,
2
 which derives from the assumption that during his/her incarceration, the 
convicted person has been rehabilitated and has the possibility of reintegrating 
into society.
3
 Concentrating exclusively on the imprisoned person, penal and 
penal procedure laws have neglected the role of those who wield the right of 
granting early release. Viewing the issue of the evolution of conditional release 
through the lenses of political science contributes to explaining the changes 
which have occurred independently of the situation of prisoners, thereby 
identifying the wide paradigm shifts which occur in criminal policy.  
The nuance which I identify indicates the reincarnation of the figure of 
the “undesirable” and, simultaneously, the political significance attributed to the 
institution of Conditional Release, which in itself gains political significance as 
the institutional capacity of the State to recover the damages, with the sentence 
also serving this function. Therefore, partially serving one’s sentence is a useful 
indicator for the understanding of the very nature of the political regime with 
regards to the coercive dimension of the state’s institutions. Taking this further, 
one could state that the dynamics of Conditional Release illustrate the 
evolutionary trajectories of the nature of the political regime. The “undesirable” 
is a benchmark which serves to explain the way in which state institutions 
function as well as to identify possible deficiencies in criminal legislation. At 
the same time, I point out particular political legitimation strategies employed 
by right holders, by bringing to the forefront the political relations which 
underpin the articulation of the political regime. 
The main objective of this research is to explain and understand the 
evolution of the complementary institution of conditional release in Romania 
between 2000 and 2019 with regards to the position of the right-holder. In this 
article, I attempt to explain the different ways in which prison release 
committees and courts have dealt with the prerogative of granting early release. 
I justify the choice of subject as a result of the social role which the 
complementary institution of conditional release exercises on the institutional, 
territorial and functional scheme of the rule of law. The complexity of the early 
release procedure allows us to understand how the committees and the courts 
have addressed the issue of granting conditional release. The option for this 
period resides in the modifications identified to have been performed on 
criminal legislation as well as the intense public echo generated by the granting 
of early release by the right holders. My aim is to identify the way in which the 
reform of the prison system in the 2000-2019 period has de facto diminished the 
prerogatives of right holders of granting conditional release. Simultaneously, 
                                               
2  See James Michael Weiss, “Humanism,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, 
Vol. 2, edited by Hans J. Hillerbrand (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 264-272. 
3  See James Bonta and Donald Arthur Andrews, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct 
(New York: Routledge, 2017). 
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the subject has occupied an important place in the public agenda, generating 
strong political and social polarization. I must point out that for the 1990-1999 
period, the Ministry of Justice and the National Administration of Penitentiaries 
do not have a centralized overview regarding the frequency of granting 
conditional release. Furthermore, the study shows how the reformation of 
criminal law between 2000 and 2019 has entailed a de facto mitigation of the 
right-holders’ ability of granting conditional release. 
Most studies on conditional release use an exclusively legal perspective, 
referring to the explanation and interpretation of the cumulative conditions to be 
met by the convicted person.
4 
I identify a dominant trend throughout European 
research to focus on the definition of conditional release as a stage in the 
individualization of punishment, in which the focus is on the behavior and 
situation of the convicted person. This research does not take into account the 
evolution of the complementary institution of conditional release in relation to 
the political and social context. The decision of right-holders to grant such 
measures is influenced by the wide-ranging paradigm shifts which arise from 
the pressure exerted by the evolving legal framework and the political context. 
So far, studies in the Romanian context have addressed conditional 
release primarily from a legal perspective, using the model of analysis 
employed in the European and American context, where the activity of the 
right-holders of granting conditional release is seen as autonomous with regards 
to the socio-political conditions in which it is exercised. Ioan Chiş and 
Alexandru Bogdan Chiş, in research dedicated to the establishment and 
execution of criminal sanctions,
5
 consider that the remodeling of the institution 
of conditional release is dependent upon the fulfillment of the initial purpose of 
the custodial sentence. The two authors use the definition established in 
Romanian legal parlance by Costică Bulai,
6
 Alexandru Boroi,
7
 Dan Lupașcu
8
 
and Traian Dima,
9
 professors of criminal law, according to whom conditional 
                                               
4  See Morris and Michael Tonry, Between Prison and Probation. 
5  Ioan Chiş and Alexandru Bogdan Chiş, Executarea sancţiunilor penale (Serving criminal 
sanctions) (Bucharest: Universul Juridic, 2015), 39-241. 
6  See Costică Bulai and Bogdan Nicolae Bulai, Manual de drept penal. Partea generală 
(Criminal Law manual. General part) (Bucharest: Universul Juridic, 2007). 
7  Alexandru Boroi, Drept penal și drept procesual penal, Curs selectiv pentru examenul de 
licență (Criminal Law and Criminal procedure law, Selective class for bachelor studies) 
(Bucharest: C.H. Beck, 2006), 198. 
8  Dan Lupașcu, “Liberarea condiționată” (“Conditional release”), in Dreptul, no. 3 (2002): 87. 
9  Traian Dima, Drept penal. Partea generală, ed. a III-a revăzută şi adăugită (Criminal 
Law. General part. 3rd edition, revised and supplemented) (Bucharest: Ed. Hamangiu, 
2014), 625. 
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release highlights “a form of the individualization of punishment during its 
execution.”
10
 
Unlike the legal approaches, this article analyzes the evolution of the 
institution of conditional release in Romania between 2000 and 2019 with 
regards to the decisions of the liberation committees and the courts. The study 
traces back the evolution of the complementary institution of conditional release 
in relation to the exogenous factors represented by the pressure of the evolving 
legal framework and the political context. These factors induce modifications to 
the strategy of political legitimacy employed by detention facility release 
committees and the courts.  
In order to explain the evolution of conditional release in the first section, 
I will illustrate the change of paradigm which has occurred in criminal doctrine 
and practice with regards to defining the punishment and its functions (literature 
review). In the second part, I shall focus on the analysis of the mechanism for 
solving early release requests, referring to the rulings of release committees and 
courts. The conclusions will emphasize a strong correlation between the 
evolving legal framework of the institution of conditional release, the political 
context and the legitimizing strategies used by the committees and courts, 
which have diversified the nature and the functioning of the complementary 
institution of conditional release between 2000 and 2019. 
 
 
Literature Review  
 
The analysis of conditional liberation has focused primarily on two 
principles, which I identify as recurrent in our literature review. On the one 
hand, modernity has contributed to the internalization of the humanization 
process,
11
 the sensibility of modern man, gradually reducing the intensity of 
coercion applied to convicted persons. On the other hand, the utilitarian 
paradigm
12
 and neo-liberalism
13
 have increased the need for a rationalization of 
constraint and reeducation, in order to efficiently manage the resources 
allocated to the prison system. 
                                               
10  Dima, Drept penal (Criminal Law), 625-626., apud. Chiş and Chiş, Executarea 
sancţiunilor penale (Serving criminal sanctions), 239. 
11  See Weiss, “Humanism,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Reformation, 264-272. 
12  See Huei-Chun Su, Economic Justice and Liberty: The Social Philosophy in John Stuart 
Mill’s Utilitarianism (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). 
13  See John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen (eds.), The Rise of Neoliberalism and 
Institutional Analysis (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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The nature of conditional release has not been questioned ab abrupto 
(abruptly), being initially defined in the doctrine of classical law.
14
 Later, 
through the development of “positivist criminology”,
15
 custodial sentences have 
been considered, per se, responsible for the failure of the moral transformation 
of convicted persons. Starting with the end of the XIX
th
 century, the process of 
corrigenda a corpus delicti (atonement for the crime) in extra muros (behind the 
walls of the detention center) has no longer been perceived as a contradictie in 
adiecto (intrinsically contradictory) or a cadit ouestio (false dilemma). In genere 
(as a rule), most reflection processes in the field of political science have started 
by questioning the purpose of the detention institution, addressing the stringent 
need for the reintegration into society of convicted persons.
16
 Isolating 
delinquents is no longer presented as a necessary measure, rather, their behavior 
needed to be addressed.
17
 De facto, the main transformation has been 
represented by the exclusion of the leper and the inclusion of the plague 
bearer,
18
 therefore bringing to the forefront the necessity of supervising 
convicted persons, prison representing a “regime of the world rather than a 
stone edifice.”
19 
At a conceptual level, political science research has imposed a major 
paradigm shift: the offender has stopped being represented as an enemy, but as 
a patient which society must treat (within society).
20
 The novelty of the critical 
approach resides in the treatment of convicted persons in their local 
                                               
14  See Jean Pradel, Droit penale comparé, ediţia Dalloz (Paris, 1995); Charles-Louis de 
Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois (Genève, 1748); 
Cesare Beccaria, Dei deliti e delle pense, Marco Coltellini (Livorno, 1764); Pellegrino 
Rossi, Traite de droit penal, Vol. III (1829): 169. 
15  The most important representatives of “positivist criminology” were the italians Cesare 
Lombroso, Enrico Feri and Raffaele Garofalo, as well as belgian Lambert Adolphe 
Jaeques Quetelet, frenchman André-Michel Guerry and englishman Henry Mayhew. See 
Cesare Lombroso, Crime, Its Causes and Remedies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918); Enrico 
Feri, Criminal Sociology, edited by W. Douglass Morrison (New York: D. Appleton & 
Co., 1896); Raffaele Garofalo, Criminology, translated by Robert Wyness Millar 
(Michigan: Little, Brown, 1914); Lambert Adolphe Jaeques Quetelet, A Treatise on Man 
and the Development of his Faculties, translated by R. Knox, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); André-Michel Guerry, Essay on the moral statistics of France: A 
sociological report to the French Academy of Science, (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 
1883); Henry Mayhew, The Criminal Prisons of London: And Scenes of Prison Life 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1968). 
16  Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation, 4. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Michel Foucault, Anormalii, Cursuri ținute la Collège de France 1974-1975 (Abnormal: 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-1975), translation by Dan Radu Stănescu, 
afterword by Bogdan Ghiu (Bucharest: Univers, 1999), 54-55.  
19  Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, translation and afterword by Bogdan Ghiu (Cluj: Ideea Design 
& Print, 2002), 34. 
20  Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation, 4-7. 
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communities, which is why the punishment does not exclusively focus on 
restricting the freedom of movement of the offenders, but includes their 
supervision for the purpose of education and reintegration into society.
21
 The 
nuances and interpretations given to the process of restoring social order
22
 have 
generated two major changes. First, addressing the establishment of an optimal 
level of coercion has highlighted the need to redefine the dimension of custodial 
sentences.
23
 Secondly, the reduction of costs associated with incarceration was 
pursued through the creation of institutions which would allow the fulfillment 
of penitentiary functions externally, focusing on the dimension of (re)education, 
supervision and reintegration of the convicted person. 
From a scientific and cultural point of view, the 20
th
 century was 
characterized by the profound changes brought about by the theory of relativity 
and technological progress. The progress of knowledge required a pragmatic 
approach, including in criminal practice, Hazel Kemshall and Jason Wood
24
 
mentioned that the 20
th
 century saw the development of a new penology of risk 
and of assessment of the impact of the use of alternative types of punishment on 
public protection.
25
 Research in the field has started from the multilevel risk 
grading,
26
 mainly used in marketing analysis. Predicting risk has become the 
main concern of research in the new penology.
27
 The application of SMART 
(Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, Targeted) indicators has led to the 
individualization of the decision to grant alternative enforcement measures 
based on the behavior and socio-demographic profile of the convicted person in 
the context of redefining values and humanizing criminal systems.
28
 These 
                                               
21  Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation. 
22  Ibid., 10-11. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Hazel Kemshall and Jason Wood, “High-risk offenders and public protection,” in Loraine 
Gelsthorpe and Rod Morgan (editors), Handbook of Probation, Chapter 13 (Portland: 
Willan Publishing, 2007), 381-397. 
25  See Anthony Bottoms, “Reflections on the renaissance of dangerousness,” Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice, no. 16 (1977): 70–96; Donald A. Andrews, James Bonta and 
Robert D. Hoge, “Classification for effective rehabilitation,” Criminal Justice and 
Behaviour, no. 17 (1990): 19–51; John Ditchfield, “Actuarial prediction and risk 
assessment,” Prison Service Journal, no. 113 (1997): 8–13; Barbara Hudson, Justice in 
the Risk Society (London: Sage, 2004); Hazel Kemshall, Risk in Probation Practice 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1998); Hazel Kemshall, Risk Assessment and Management of 
Known Sexual and Violent Offenders: A Review of Current Issues (London: Home Office, 
2001); Hazel Kemshall, Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 2003); Mike Nash, Public Protection and the Criminal Justice Process 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Nigel Walker, Dangerous People (London: 
Blackstone Press, 1996). 
26  Kemshall and Wood, “High-risk offenders,” 387. 
27  Ibid, 388. 
28  Ibid, 390. 
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processes have led both the redefinition of punishment and the relativization of 
the deprivation of liberty.
29
 
Another important moment was the gradual replacement of custodial 
sentences with a new type of “contract” between judge and offender. Starting 
with the second half of the 20
th
 century, representatives of the theory of “social 
defense”
30
 advocated the adoption of alternative punishments in lieu of 
imprisonment. On the one hand, alternative measures have been used to resolve 
the pressing problem of prison overcrowding, as well as to reduce the perverse 
effects of deprivation of liberty. On the other hand, the conditional release of 
convicted persons and their placement under supervision was aimed at 
preventing, as far as possible, the commission of new crimes. 
The granting of conditional release is a necessary measure for 
capitalizing on the process of individualizing one’s sentence, an essential 
component of criminal doctrine and practice. The granting of these measures 
according to the behavior and conduct of prisoners offers a high level of 
predictability to the complementary institution of conditional release, the 
convicted person being at the center of the decision-making process. Otherwise, 
the institution of conditional release runs the risk of politicization. 
In the Romanian context, conditional release was defined as an 
alternative way of individualizing the execution of punishment, the main 
characteristic being represented by the establishment of probation control and of 
measures and imposed obligations, in the absence of the deprivation of liberty.
31
 
The paradigm centered on a regime of progressive liberty deprivation has 
defined conditional release as a measure undertaken in order to “motivate and 
empower individuals deprived of freedom”,
32
 both during their detention as well 
as afterwards, during their term of probation.
33
 Although contributing to the 
partial removal of the execution of the punishment, conditional release is 
distinguished from clemency through its optional nature and the judiciary 
assessment
34
 of the fulfillment of certain conditions. Being always dispensed 
                                               
29  Morris and Tonry, Between Prison and Probation, 4. 
30  See Filipo Gramatica, Principes de défense sociale (Paris : Cujas, 1963); Marc ANCEL, 
La défense sociale nouvelle (Paris : Cujas, 1981). 
31  Aurel Ciobanu and Teodor Manea, Elena Lazăr, Dragoș Pârgaru, Legea nr. 254/2013 
privind executarea pedepselor și a măsurilor privative de libertate dispuse de organele 
judiciare în cursul procesului penal. Comentată și adnotată (Law 254/2013 regarding the 
execution of punishments and custodial sentences passed by judicial bodies during 
criminal proceedings. Commented and annotated) (Bucahrest: Hamangiu, 2017), 315. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Iancu Mândru, Amnistia  i Graţierea (Amnesty and Pardon) (Bucharest: All Educaţional, 
1998), 499-500. 
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post judiciarum,
35
 the nature of conditional release is defined both through its 
general and individual application. Regardless of the nature or severity of the 
offense,
36
 convicted persons have the right to conditional release with regards to 
their behavior during incarceration.
37
 Conditional release enshrines the act of 
justice as being based on the principle of granting  “another chance” to the 
convicted persons, which is why the length of incarceration is not based solely 
on the ruling of the court at the time of sentencing, but also on the 
accountability and responsibility of the convicted person.
38
 
Another important feature of conditional release is the recognition, by the 
court, of the “confidence that the convict has been rehabilitated, following the 
fulfillment of conditions imposed on his behavior while serving the compulsory 
part of the sentence.”
39
 The rewarding dimension also aims to re-socialize the 
convicted person, with the post-release probation period serving as both 
supervision and societal reintegration of the individual.
40 
 The significance of 
conditional release is closely related to the trust which state institutions afford 
the convicted person.  
 
 
Research Hypothesis 
 
My main argument thus sets out to underlines the limitations to the 
absolute power of conditional release boards, which are under pressure from a 
series of exogenous factors. I aim to highlight how the endorsement, 
postponement or denial of early release proposals are dependent upon sudden 
changes of the evolving legal framework. I must also take into consideration the 
part played by the wider political context as well as the various political 
legitimacy strategies used by the holders of the right of conditional release 
between 2000 and 2019. 
The gradual establishment in the post-communist Romanian context of 
the paradigm centered on the necessity of individualizing the punishment of 
convicted persons has contributed to the redefinition of the legal framework, 
                                               
35  Maximilian Bălăşescu, Liberarea condiţionată în reglementarea noului Cod penal  i a 
Legii nr. 254/2013 (Conditional release as regulated by the New Penal Code and Law 
254/2013) (Bucharest: Hamangiu, 2015), 2. 
36  Ibid, 41. 
37  Ibid, 43. 
38  Alina Sanda Vasile (Bălan), Terapia ocupațională pentru persoanele private de libertate 
sau aflate în probațiune (Occupational therapy for convicted persons in prison or on 
probation) (Bucharest: Pro Universitaria, 2017), 116. 
39  Chiş and Chiş, Executarea sancţiunilor penale (Serving criminal sanctions), 239. 
40  Ibid. 
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thereby achieving the shift from retributive justice to restorative justice.
41
 The 
main concern for the legislator was the identification of mechanisms to tailor 
the nature and length of the punishment not only to the severity of the offense, 
but rather to the behavior of the convicted person throughout his incarceration. 
The stringent need to streamline resource allocation, given the high costs of 
imprisonment, has led to the reformation of criminal law on two levels, namely: 
a) the periodic redefining of the length of compulsory incarceration, the 
sentence having established the maximum length of it; b) redefining the nature 
of deprivation of freedom, in the sense of identifying ways of serving the 
sentence outside of penitentiaries. 
The secondary argument regards the representation of conditional early 
release as a main policy of reform through which the legislator has aimed at 
individualizing punishment both inside and outside of the prison system. The 
rhetoric based on the fact that punishment involving the deprivation of liberty 
no longer corresponds with the purpose pursued through the sentences ordered 
by the court was de facto complemented by the need to relieve the penitentiary 
system, given the high costs generated by the prison population. Specifically, 
the issue regarding the individual’s capacity to reintegrate into society was 
overtaken by the more pressing matters regarding penitentiary costs and 
crowding. The necessity for the deprivation of freedom was therefore defined 
primarily with regards to the reduction of costs per inmate, the decision of the 
right holders regarding conditional release being circumscribed by the 
restrictive amendments adopted by the legislator. 
The essence of the political regime can, thus, be observed when the 
prisoner whose conditional release request is being processed bears “a name” 
and an important political status. The rest of the sentence to be served explains 
the level of personalization and politicization of the complementary institution 
of conditional release. Here I refer to the reparation of moral and material 
damages caused to society and state institutions, the high frequency for granting 
conditional release to prisoners who have had past political experience 
representing an indicator of the state’s efficiency in combating the criminal 
phenomenon among them. The activity reports of the National Anticorruption 
Directorate / National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (DNA/PNA) are 
dampened by the limited effect which the sentence exerts on the convict. The 
reduction of the significance of the sentence is superimposed on the institutional 
and political pursuits in the fight against corruption at all levels (but especially 
at high level). 
Another particularity which I identify concerns the nature of the crimes 
for which persons with prior political experience have been convicted. One 
                                               
41  Howard Zehr, Changing lenses: a new focus for crime and justice Christian peace shelf 
selection (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1990), 211. 
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observes that most crimes fall within the sphere of corruption offenses, acts 
committed while holding a public office or with the aim of obtaining undue 
benefits through political influence. The damage done has negatively impacted 
the nature of the political regime itself, which is why by imposing prison 
sentences, courts have aimed one the one side to sanction and (re)educate the 
perpetrators of the crimes and on the other, to (re)consolidate the institutions of 
the state, with the aim of reinforcing the rule of law. For this reason, the state is 
an ever-present entity for the convicted person until the end of the criminal 
report. Thus, the decision to grant conditional release is not just about the 
behavior and conduct of the convicted person, but also about the nature of the 
political regime. Conditional release “cuts the cord” abruptly, (sometimes) 
prematurely, before the criminal report is extinguished. 
 
 
Research Methodology 
 
In this research, I will use as a case study the construction of the 
complementary institution of conditional release in the period 2000-2019 by 
examining the decisions issued by the liberation committees and the courts. To 
this end, I use information provided by the National Administration of 
Penitentiaries (ANP) regarding the penitentiary occupancy rate and the dynamics 
of exit from incarceration before having served the whole sentence. I place the 
evolution of conditional release in relation to the frequency of granting early 
liberation and the steps taken to reform penal legislation. In order to obtain a 
macro image, I employ quantitative data analysis,
42
 which serves in identifying 
the main stages of the dynamics of conditional release. At a micro level, 
qualitative content analysis
43
 aids in underlining the relationship between the 
individualization of punishment and the fight against corruption by referencing 36 
public and political figures which have been granted conditional release. 
Chronologically, I analyze three distinct stages of the evolution of 
conditional release, framed by the wide-ranging paradigm change in the 
political context, determined by the stage of joining the European Union and the 
fight against corruption’s gradual seizure of the public agenda. In the first stage, 
I analyze the dynamics of conditional liberation in the period 2000-2003, when 
I identify the first attempts at reforming penal law and articulating an 
institutional framework that is compatible with accession to the European 
Union. At the same time, however, the need to free up the courts and reduce 
                                               
42  See Todd D. Little (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Quantitative Methods, Vol. 2 
Statistical Analysis (Oxford AND New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
43  See Anselm L. Strauss, Qualitative analysis for social scientists (Cambridge: University 
Press, 1987); Roberto Franzosi, From words to numbers. Narrative, data, and social 
science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
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prison occupancy rates has led to the imposition of a permissive criminal policy 
with regards to the reduction of the length of execution of custodial sentences. 
In the second stage, I explain the paradigm shift which occurs in the 2004-2008 
period, in the context of stepping up the efforts for EU accession and the 
gradual seizure of the public agenda by the issue of the fight against corruption. 
In the third stage, I analyze the evolution of conditional release after 2009, 
given the new restrictive changes made to criminal law, the practice of courts 
being defined in relation of the recovery of damages. 
For each stage, I compare the level of concordance between the decisions 
of liberation committees and the decisions of the courts regarding early release 
requests, both at the first term and at the appeal. This analysis is useful in 
identifying the macro-level dynamics for the invalidation of Liberation 
Committees’ decisions of granting conditional release by the courts, an issue 
which illustrates the migration of the central influence on the matter towards the 
courts, which have a de facto veto in the process. I analyze the decisions of 
granting early release in relation to the DNA’s (National Anticorruption 
Directorate) activity summary, in order to test the impact of the criminal law 
reforms (primarily the component regarding the fight against corruption) on the 
decisions of the right holders of conditional release. According to the Ministry of 
Justice, in the module of judicial statistics of the ECRIS system used by the 
courts, “there is no metadata or statistical attributes that particularize cases of 
conditional release requests with regards to the criminal act or infraction which 
has brought on the conviction of the person.”
44
 The difficulty in obtaining a 
centralized list of every convicted person (in the case in which such a database 
existed – The N.A.P. and the Ministry of Justice have not provided the requested 
information), meant that I had to rely exclusively on “open source” information 
available online. By applying this methodology, I have been able to identify just 
part of the persons which have been granted conditional release, those who have 
attracted the attention of the media. Only the persons who have served in a public 
capacity or have had a public image have been identified, thus their conditional 
release was publicized by mass media. With few exceptions, the (incomplete) 
profile of the beneficiaries of conditional release has an eminently political 
dimension, as the persons in question have served, prior to their conviction, in a 
public capacity or were members of a political party. These two criteria place 
them in a certain sphere of political influence, which is why their conditional 
release echoes loudly in the public and political space. 
This approach helps us distinguish three different legitimizing strategies 
used by liberation committees and the courts in three distinct stages, on the 
basis of which I prove that the complementary institution of conditional release 
                                               
44  See Ministry of Justice, “Answer no. 71837/2019 to the request for statistical data 
regarding cases of conditional release requests for the period 2000-2018,” 26 august 2019. 
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has evolved with regards to the changes of penal legislation and the political 
context, the convicted person’s behavior having passed in the background. 
 
 
Results 
 
The absolute power of the right-holders of granting conditional release has 
been limited by the action of exogenous factors such as the pressure of the evolving 
legal framework and the political context. Various political legitimacy strategies 
used by the right-holders of conditional release are determined by the widespread 
paradigm shift which occurred in criminal law reform and prison realities. A 
fundamental institution of the rule of law, conditional release has known, de facto, 
three distinct stages of interpretation and application of the principle of humanism 
underlying criminal law and criminal enforcement legislation. 
The first stage presents a high number of conditional release requests 
granted by the courts on the recommendations of parole committees in the 
period 2000-2003. Granting conditional release for a number of 98.022 
beneficiaries (with an average frequency of 24.505 persons released per year, 
see Table no. 3) occurs in the context of an extremely high rate of prison 
occupancy (the average annual occupancy degree with regards to the 4 m
2
 per 
inmate standard was 197.97%, see Table no. 1), which is why although the 
courts’ decisions led to the reduction of overcrowding, this phenomenon was 
still extremely high. During this stage, courts admit over 83% of liberation 
committee proposals and postpone the rest (see Table no. 3). At appeal, more 
than three quarters of requests formulated by convicted persons were admitted 
by the court and there were no outright denials (see Table no. 3). At this stage, 
the necessity of reforming criminal legislation is brought into discussion,
45
 an 
issue stemming from the need for political legitimacy following the fall of 
communism
46
 and embracing, at the same time, the principle of humanism in 
reforming criminal law. Nonetheless, the interference of politics in justice 
activities,
47
 together with “procedural constraints, political disinterest and 
chaotic activism”
48
 have pointed out “the fragility of the [institutions of the] rule 
of law in the face of momentary political interests.”
49
 
                                               
45  Raluca Grosescu and Raluca Ursachi, Justiția penală de tranziție. De la  ürnberg la 
postcomunismul românesc (Transitional criminal justice. From Nürnberg to Romanian 
post-communism), Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania (Iași: 
Polirom, 2009), 18. 
46  Ibid., 208-210. 
47  Ibid., 149-155. 
48  Ibid., 182.  
49  Ibid., 201.  
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The second stage is characterized by the increased reluctance of 
committees and courts, after the formation of the National Anticorruption 
Directorate, which started scrutinizing the activity of judges and correctional 
facility personnel. During the period 2004-2008, the number of beneficiaries of 
conditional release is much smaller (73.285 persons released pre-term, with an 
average frequency of 11.256 beneficiaries per year, see Table no. 3), while at the 
same time seeing a decrease in prison occupancy rates down to 133.70% (average 
annual value with regards to the 4 m
2
 standard, see Table no. 1). In this stage, the 
level of concordance regarding the admission by the courts of conditional release 
requests formulated by the committees’ drops from 86.25% to 72.30%, as a result 
of an increase in the number of postponed and rejected requests (see Table no. 3). 
Appeals saw the admission of two thirds of requests by the courts (see Table no. 
3). An increase of the level of confidence granted to justice activities (situated 
around 26%, see Table no. 2), together with the results of the National 
Anticorruption Prosecutor’s office (PNA) with regards to the struggle against 
corruption, have influenced the activities of the courts, this being the stage where 
proposals for conditional release were denied for the first time. 
The process of accession to the European Union was “an important break 
point in the functioning of the Romanian judiciary”,
50
 the main objective being 
“to reproduce an institutional model of the independence of the justice 
system.”
51
 By establishing a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (MCV) 
in the field of judicial reform and the fight against corruption,
52
 the Commission 
of the European Communities (now the European Commission) has pursued, in 
the case of Romania, the “empowerment and efficiency of the judiciary and law 
enforcement.”
53
 Since 2007, the MCV reports have been the main milestone 
which has highlighted both the progress and slippages made by Romania in 
meeting the specific objectives set at the time of EU accession.
54
 This 
                                               
50  Ramona Coman, Réformer la justice dans un pays post-communiste. Le cas de la 
Roumanie (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009), 13. 
51  Ibid., 31. 
52  Commission of the European Communities, Decision of 13 December 2006 establishing a 
mechanism for cooperation and verification of progress in Romania to address specific 
benchmarks in the areas of judicial reform and the fight against corruption [notified 
under document number C(2006) 6569], 2006/928/CE, published in the Official Journal 
of the European Union, L354/56 from 14.12.2006, accessed April 3, 2020, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32006D0928&from=RO, accessed 
7th December 2018. 
53  Ibid. 
54  See Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council on Romania’s progress on accompanying 
measures following Accession, Brussels, 27.6.2007, COM(2007) 378 final; as well as 
General and technical reports regarding Romania’s progress  in the Mechanism for 
Cooperation and Verification, published by the European Commission (Commission of 
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mechanism reflected the status quo in Romania in the areas of judicial reform 
and anti-corruption struggle, both of them existing at the time of accession and 
post-accession, on the basis of which the EU institutions recommended the 
adoption of “specific accompanying measures”, established to prevent or 
remedy “identified deficiencies”.
55
 
During this period, the construction of the public agenda focused on the 
issue of corruption
56
 – which was perceived as being a “widespread problem in 
Romania”
57
 – this becoming the main dimension of the cleavage present in 
Romanian society.
58
 In the context of the transition to democracy and the steps 
taken for accession to the European Union, the issue of corruption had already 
become a concern for Romanian society,
59
 marked by political instability and 
socio-economic disparities.
60
 Referring to the corruption perception index, one 
notices that Romania was, at the end of 2004, on the same level as Turkey, 
                                                                                                                   
the European Communities) between 2007-2019, available on the website of the Ministry 
of Justice, accessed April 3, 2020, http://www.just.ro/mcv/.  
55  See Commission of the European Communities, COM (2007) 378 final. 
56  See Alexandra Iancu, “Questioning Anticorruption in Postcommunist Contexts. Romanian 
MPs from Commitment to Contestation,” Südosteuropa, vol. 66, no. 3 (2018), 392-417; 
Roxana Bratu, Corruption, Informality and Entrepreneurship in Romania (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); Mihaela Ristei Gugiu, “EU Enlargement and Anticorruption. 
Lessons Learned from Romania,” Journal of European Integration, vol. 34, no 5 (2012): 
429-446; Ramona Coman, “Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial 
Independence in Central and Eastern Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 66, no. 6 (2014): 
892-924. 
57  “According to the special Eurobarometer of 2013 regarding corruption, 93% of Romanian 
respondents agreed that corruption was a widespread problem in their country (EU 
average: 76%), while 42% claim that they have personally been affected by corruption in 
their day to day life (EU Average: 26%),” in  European Commission, Annex no. 23 – 
Annex Romania to the EU Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, 3.2.2014, COM(2014)38 
final, 3; See also European Commission, EU Anti-Corruption Report, Brussels, 3.2.2014, 
COM(2014)38 final. 
58  See Peter Flora and Stein Kuhnle, Derek Urwin (eds.), State Formation, Nation-Building, 
and Mass Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
59  This aspect was pointed out explicitly by President Traian Băsescu on 12 January 2005, 
when participating at the first meeting of the Supreme Magistrates’ Council, according to 
whom “Romania can be still hampered in its accession process by two issues: corruption 
and the poor functioning of the justice system”. See Press Release of the Presidential 
Administration on 12 January 2005, accessed December 9, 2018, http://old.presidency.ro/ 
index.php?_RID=det&tb=date_arhiva&id=6493&_PRID=arh. 
60  Statistics on the distribution of “Work resources by development regions” (1990-2013), 
“Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by region” (1995-2008), “Registered 
unemployment benefits beneficiaries, by age group” (1993-2013), “Legally commenced 
strikes, by types of strikes” (1992-2009) can be found in the study “The economic and 
social situation in Romania” by Enache Steluţa Georgeta, published by the European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2015, accessed March 21, 2019, https://www.eesc. 
europa.eu/sites/default/files/resources/docs/qe-01-15-435-ro-n.pdf.  
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Bulgaria and Macedonia, according to Transparency International’s Global 
Corruption Barometer.
61
 On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 5 corresponds to 
“extremely corrupt”), the perception indexes for the justice and political 
systems were recorded at similar very high values (4.1 and 4.2 respectively).
62
 
Following the accession of Romania to the European Union in the 
context of the reform of criminal legislation (by the adoption of the New 
Criminal Code
63
 and the New Criminal Procedure Code
64
), I identify the third 
stage, consisting in redefining the normative framework, necessary in order to 
reestablish consensus between the nature and utility of the punishment. By 
repealing provisions from the Penal Code of 1969 and of Law no. 275/2006, the 
nature of conditional release was redefined through the provisions of articles 
100-106 of the New Criminal Code, which were complemented by those of art. 
95-97 of Law no. 254/2013,
65
 together with the substantial provisions of art. 
587-588 of the New Criminal Procedure Code.
66
 The novelty introduced in 
penal legislation with regards to conditional release has considerably narrowed 
the profile of potential beneficiaries, as they must now serve their sentence in 
open or semi-open detention regimes (art. 100. (1), b) of the New Criminal 
Code) and must now have a-priori integrally fulfilled the civil obligations 
ordered by the court in their sentence (including having repaid damages), with 
the exception of situations in which they can prove that “they had no possibility 
of fulfilling them.”
67
 The pre-term release of 89.223 persons in the period 2009-
2017 (with an average frequency of 9.913 persons conditionally released per 
year, see Table no. 3) occurs in the context of the low rate of penitentiary 
occupation (an average annual value of 129.21% with regards to the 4 m
2
 
standard, see Table no. 1). The level of consistency between the proposals of 
                                               
61  See Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2004, London, Pluto Press, 
2004, accessed December 7, 2018, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/ publication/ 
global_corruption_report_2004_political_corruption. 
62  Ibid. 
63  Romanian Parliament, Law no. 286/2009 regarding the Criminal Code, published in the 
Official Monitor of Romania, Part I, no. 510, 24 July 2009, with subsequent amendments, 
in force since February 1st 2014. 
64  Romanian Parliament, Law no. 135/2010 regarding the New Criminal Procedure Code, 
published in the Official Monitor of Romania, Part I, no. 486, 15 July 2010, in force since 
February 1st 2014.  
65  Romanian Parliament, Law no. 254/2013 regarding the serving of punishments and 
custodial sentences ordered by judicial bodies during criminal proceedings, published in 
the Official Monitor of Romania, Part I, no. 514, 14.08.2013. 
66  Gabriela-Nicoleta Chihaia, “Liberarea condiţionată din pedeapsa închisorii – consideraţii 
asupra condiţiilor de acordare din perspectiva evoluţiei acestora” (“Conditional release 
from prison – considerations on the conditions for its granting from the perspective of 
their evolution”), in Dreptul românesc la 100 de ani de la Marea Unire. Dimensiuni  i 
tendinţe, edited by the Romanian Academy, Institute of Legal Research “Acad. Andrei 
Rădulescu” (Bucharest, 20 April 2018), 485-491. 
67  Ibid., 490. 
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liberation committees and court decisions regarding the granting of early release 
registers a considerable decrease, from 64.93% in 2009 to 44.11% in 2017. Less 
than half of the proposals of the conditional release committees are admitted by 
the courts, while the number of delayed and rejected proposals rises from 2.282 
to 5.945 (see Table no. 3).
 
 
The paradigm shift is emphasized by the overlapping of the themes of the 
fight against corruption with criminal policy, in a context of an increase in 
public confidence for the activity of the justice system (it increases from 25% to 
36% in 2018, its highest recorded value having been 46% in 2014, see Table no. 
2). The intensification of the judicial reform process
68
 resulted in the application 
of cumulative conditions necessary to obtain the right to early release. The 
prosecution and definitive conviction of high ranking dignitaries who were 
accused of corruption (including ministers and former members of the 
Government, senators and members of the European Parliament) sent a 
shockwave through the public perception that underlined the fleeting omphalos 
of immunity before the law.
69
 In the period 2009-2017, the National 
Anticorruption Directorate dealt with 33.837 cases of corruption-related 
offenses, which led to the trial of 9.730 defendants and definitive prison 
sentences for 6.661 of them.
70
 Through the activity of the DNA (PNA), the 
reform of justice focused on combating corruption at all levels, as among those 
sent to trial (and subsequently convicted) were ministers, secretaries of state, 
former members of the Cabinet, members of the Chamber of Deputies, senators, 
members of the European Parliament, mayors, directors of public institutions 
and state-owned companies as well as judges and prosecutors (see Table no. 2). 
The complete overtaking of the public agenda with the issue of anti-corruption 
emphasized the reluctance of the right-holders of conditional release, having 
stressed the issue of recovering damages and discouraging corruption. 
Prima facie (at first sight), the occupancy rate of penitentiaries was not a 
basis for conditional release. Indirectly, however, a high degree of occupancy 
let to a large number of requests from inmates being analyzed by conditional 
release committees and subsequently by the courts. The individualization of 
punishment and periodic evaluation of inmates have influenced the activity of 
both committees and courts, their activity relating to the workload. As the 
committees and courts were relieved, one can notice an increase in the 
                                               
68  Coman, Réformer la justice, 31. 
69  Lato sensu, through this concept I extend the sphere of immunity from the Constitutional 
provisions applied to a specific category of dignitaries (the basis being the limited term 
when that person holds office, with explicit mechanisms for withdrawing immunity being 
in place) to the perception of the impunity these political figures had (due to their 
influence and political status), which put them above the law. 
70  Statistics drawn up by parsing the data presented in Synthesis of activity reports of the 
National Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office and  ational Anticorruption Directorate in 
the period 2002-2018. 
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reluctance to grant conditional release, thereby underlining the tendency to 
postpone requests. Even if the reform of the criminal justice system aimed at 
involving convicted persons in various activities throughout their sentence,
71
 the 
number of beneficiaries of conditional release decreased, even if the percentage 
of repeat offenders among the prison population started gradually declining 
from 2007 to 2016 from 47% to 38%.
72
 A high rate of detention unit occupancy 
(determined primarily by the size of the prison population) contributed to the 
overloading of committees and courts, which therefore had to solve a large 
number of requests. Conversely, a reduction in the occupancy rate (and by 
default of the prison population) led to a relief of committees and courts, who 
then had fewer requests to address. The year 2000 saw the largest number of 
early release requests submitted by inmates (34.964 requests), a period when the 
penitentiary system was confronted with an extremely high rate of occupancy 
(48.267 inmates for 22.407 accommodations, taking into account a standard of 
4 m
2
 of space per inmate with an occupancy index of 215.40%, see Table no. 1), 
while 2010 saw the lowest number of requests (13.850), during a time when the 
rate of prison occupancy had dropped to 123.90% (28.244 inmates for 22.794 
accommodations at a 4 m
2
/inmate standard, see Table no. 1).
 
 
Changes to the legal framework and the seizure of the public agenda by 
the fight against corruption have, simultaneously, led to a repositioning of the 
right-holders of conditional release with regards to the nature of punishment. I 
identify different positions of the right-holders on principles around which the 
doctrine on the subject had been established. On the one hand, the humanization 
and sensitizing processes of the right-holders had evolved with regards to the 
changes to the legal framework. On the other hand, the evolution of conditional 
                                               
71  See National Administration of Penitentiaries, “Available educational activities and 
programs, as well as psychological and social assistance,” 2018, accessed March 29, 
2019, http://anp.gov.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/oferta-de-programe-%C8%99i-activit 
% C4%83%C8%9Bi-educative-de- asisten%C8%9B%C4%83-psihologic%C4%83-
%C8%99i-....pdf.  
72  Data on repeat offenses was obtained from the National Administration of Penitentiaries’ 
annual activity reports from 2008 to 2016. See National Administration of Penitentiaries, 
Annual activity reports for 2012-2017, accessed April 3, 2018, http://anp.gov.ro/despre–
anp/rapoarte–si–studii/. For an in-depth analysis, see Cristina Dâmboeanu, “Fenomenul 
recidivei în România” (“The phenomenon of repeat offense”), Calitatea Vieţii, XXII, no. 
3 (2011): 295–312; Cristina Dâmboeanu, “Cercetarea fenomenului de recidivă din 
perspectiva ‘carierei infracţionale’” (“Researching the phenomenon of repeat offense 
from the perspective of a ‘career of crime’”), Revista Română de Sociologie, new series, 
Year XIX, no. 5–6 (2008): 395–404; Ciprian Sebastian Sabău, “Reducerea ratei de 
recidivă a persoanelor care au executat pedepse privative de libertate din perspectiva unui 
lucrător în penitenciar” (“Reducing the rate of repeat offense for people who have served 
custodial sentences from the perspective of a penitentiary employee”), Revista de Practică 
Penitenciară, no. 1 (2019): 19-23. 
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release bent to the utilitarian paradigm of efficient and economic management 
of the resources allocated to the prison system. 
In order to test the relationship between the individualization of the 
punishment and the fight against corruption, I have selected 36 public and 
political figures which have been granted conditional release, but I must 
mention that this list is not exhaustive. It is notable that the majority of these 
persons have served at least 1/3 of their sentence and only in 10 cases has 
conditional release been granted prior to the serving of that fraction of the 
sentence. Cumulating sentences, one can observe that from 170 years in prison 
which were sentenced, in total a number of 73 were actually served, an aspect 
which emphasizes the courts’ and conditional release committees’ tendencies of 
finally granting conditional release after the prisoner has served one third of 
their sentence. What draws attention, however, is the high level of damages, 
estimated at over 280 million euros, as taking bribes, trafficking in influence, 
abuse of office and money laundering are the primary crimes which explain the 
high level of material damages. In genere, these crimes were committed while 
serving in a public capacity or while holding a position in a political party. The 
sentencing and serving of jail time has thus obtained the symbolic role of 
combatting high level corruption. Among those convicted, one can find Adrian 
Năstase, Dan Voiculescu, Adrian Severin, Miron Mitrea, Relu Fenechiu, Codruț 
Sereș, Zsolt Nagy, Gabriel Berca, Ionel Manțog, Cătălin Voicu, Nati Meir, 
Gheorghe Ștefan, Antonie Solomon, Romeo Stavarache, etc. 
This list, however, does not contain Miron Cozma, who was sentenced, 
on the 28th of September 2005, to 10 years in prison for the events of Costești 
of 1999. Between December 2005 and November 2007, the Conditional Release 
Committees (of both Timișoara and Rahova Penitentiaries) have issued three 
favorable opinions on the requests for conditional release submitted by the 
former miner leader.
73
 The first two opinions were initially approved by the 
magistrates of the Timișoara Court and the Bucharest Sector 5 Court 
respectively, but ultimately the requests for conditional release were denied 
after the courts admitted the appeals submitted by the Prosecutor’s Office. The 
exception was the sending of the case to the Constitutional Court by the 
magistrates of the Sector 5 Court, which led to Miron Cozma serving his 
sentence in full.
74
 
                                               
73  See Ovidiu Ciutescu, “The conditional release of Miron Cozma is being discussed,” 
Jurnalul  ațional, 15 November 2007, accessed August 28, 2019, https://jurnalul. 
antena3.ro/fun/se-discuta-eliberarea-conditionata-a-lui-miron-cozma-109005.html.  
74  The exception of unconstitutionality was denied by the judges of the Constitutional Court 
through the Decision no. 454 of 22 April 2008 regarding the exception of 
unconstitutionality of the provisions of art. 59 para. (1) of the Criminal Code, art. 75 of 
Law no. 275/2006 regarding the serving of punishments and measures imposed by 
judicial organs throughout the criminal proceedings and art. 460, para. (1) of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, published in the Official Monitor no. 435 of June 10 2008. 
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Table no. 4 contains convicted persons who originate from within the 
circle of power or have important ties to right holders, being perceived by those 
outside of the political entourage as “undesirable”. The reincarnation of the 
figure of Miron Cozma incites debate on the issue of reducing the sentence, the 
individualization of punishment being relegated to the background. The 
conditional release of “undesirables” is often perceived as an abatement of the 
fight against corruption. Moreover, the reduction of sentences of persons like 
Sandu Anghel (alias Bercea Mondial), Ion Balint (alias Nuțu Cămătaru) or 
Gregorian Bivolaru raises serious questions regarding the state’s capacity to 
discourage criminality while at the same time ensuring public order. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have demonstrated that the decisions of the right-holders 
of conditional release were influenced by the dynamics of the evolving legal 
framework and the evolution of the political landscape. The need for political 
legitimacy determined right-holders to become reluctant in granting these 
measures, thereby slowly abandoning the paradigm centered on individualizing 
punishment. The paradigm which did prevail was one based on the economic 
management of limited prison system resources. The results of this research 
have therefore validated the arguments which underpinned our approach. 
Overall, the main stages of the articulation of the complementary 
institution of conditional release reflect the timing of release in relation to the 
pressure exerted on right-holders by the situation inside penitentiaries and the 
gradual seizure of the public agenda by the fight against corruption. The 
worthiness of obtaining early release was slowly voided of substance, the focus 
having been set on the recovery of damages and not on the behavior of the 
convicted person.  
Chronologically, I have identified three distinct stages of the evolution of 
conditional release, each stage having been framed by extensive paradigm shifts 
for criminal law and political context. Accession to the European Union and the 
reformation of criminal legislation while focusing on the goal of fighting against 
corruption have imposed a new outlook from right-holders to the prerogative of 
granting early release. Therefore, in the period of 2000-2003, the complementary 
institution of conditional release aimed at relieving the courts, becoming, 
simultaneously, a tool which enabled a decrease in the occupancy rates of 
penitentiaries. The high frequency of granting early release which I notice in this 
period has been explained in the context of a weak articulation of the legal 
framework, the only basis being the principle of humanism. Later, in the period 
2004-2008, the intensifying efforts of accession to the European Union and the 
gradual seizure of the public agenda by the fight against corruption had created a 
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new paradigm, centered on the need to efficiently manage the resources allocated 
to the prison system. The utilitarian paradigm evolved, in the third stage, to 
underpin the recovery of damages as paramount. This meant the intertwining of 
criminal proceedings with the convicted person’s repair of the damages leading, 
from 2009 onwards, to reluctance in the granting of conditional release, as a result 
of restrictive changes brought to the legal framework. 
Amendments to criminal legislation, together with the changes brought 
about in the practice of the courts, led to a reduction in the degree of 
consistency between the decisions of penitentiary conditional release 
committees and the decisions of the courts. The different legitimizing strategies 
employed by right-holders were the main unexpected result of this research, 
given that the changes to the legal framework apply to both decision levels. I 
have explained this discrepancy as a result of an increase in postponements and 
refusals issued by the courts, in a context where the court workload was 
relieved and prison occupancy rates were reduced. Solving conditional release 
requests was therefore no longer a priority in court activity. 
 
 
 
 
Table no. 1. Statistics on the occupancy rates of penitentiaries in Romania
 
in the period 1989-2019 
 
 
Year 
 
Crime rate ‰ 
(number of 
persons with 
definitive 
convictions per 
100000 
inhabitants) 
 
 
 
Number of inmates 
 
 
Number of accomodations (relative to a standard of 4m
2
/inmate) 
 
 
Occupancy index % (for 4m
2
) 
15.12.1989 - 33.432 19.213 174 
1990 160 26.010 19.477 133,53 
1991 263 39.609 20.657 191,74 
1992 303 44.011 21.025 209,32 
1993 366 44.521 20.572 216,41 
1994 421 43.990 20.498 214,59 
1995 448 45.309 20.796 217,87 
1996 460 42.445 20.560 206,44 
1997 496 45.121 21.014 214,71 
1998 472 52.149 22.235 234,53 
1999 390 49.790 21.963 226,69 
2000 336 48.267 22.407 215,40 
2001 370 49.840 23.074 215,99 
2002 375 48.075 25.484 188,64 
2003 353 42.815 24.908 171,88 
2004 320 39.031 25.737 151,65 
2005 304 36.700 24.916 147,29 
2006 263 34.038 25.283 134,62 
2007 214 29.390 24.421 120,34 
2008 171 26.212 22.866 114,63 
2009 159 26.698 22.640 117,92 
2010 195 28.244 22.794 123,90 
05.04.2011 223 28.963 23.690 122,25 
2012 245 23.991 18.029 133,06 
2013 236 25.991 19.267 134,89 
2014 205 26.192 19.212 136,33 
2015 213 25.137 18.778 133,86 
2016 166 25.431 18.970 134,05 
2017 181 23.450 19.121 126,67 
2018 165 20.792 17.037 113,73 
2019 - 19.241 17.146 112,21 
Source: Data parsed from statistical information provided by the National Administration of Penitentiaries and the National Institute  of Statistics. See National 
Administration of Penitentiaries, Public policy document regarding the improvement of detention conditions, April 2011, p. 6-7; National Administration of 
Penitentiaries, The dynamics of prison population: The state of prison accommodations and inmate population on December 24, 2018, accessed April 15, 2020, 
http://anp.gov.ro/informatii/dinamica-efectivelor/; National Institute of Statistics: Rate of crime by macro-regions, development regions and counties 1990-2018, 
accessed April 3, 2019, http://statistici.insse.ro/, National Administration of Penitentiaries, answer to the request filed under no. 500151/08.10.2018. 
 
 
Table no. 2. Results of the fight against high and mid-level corruption with regards to the dynamics of confidence in justice activities in Romania 
in the period 2003-2019 
Year Corruption cases solved No. of defendants sent to trial No. of persons with definitive convictions Confidence in justice activities (%) 
2003 951 548 22 - 
2004 1.366 1.067 414 26% 
2005 1.633 744 73 35% 
2006 1.509 360 80 25% 
2007 2.070 451 63 25% 
2008 2.302 683 63 26% 
2009 2.642 552 131 28% 
2010 2.957 937 154 23% 
2011 3.313 1.091 298 - 
2012 3.578 828 743 - 
2013 3.785 1.073 1.051 44% 
2014 4.125 1.167 1.138 46% 
2015 2.656 1.258 970 41% 
2016 3.341 1.271 879 40% 
2017 3.893 997 713 36% 
2018 3.547 556 584 36% 
2019 2.694 501 422 - 
Source: Synthesis of activity reports for the  ational Anticorruption Prosecutor’s office and the  ational Anticorruption Directorate in the period 2002-2019, 
accessed April 3, 2020, http://www.pna.ro/results.xhtml and European Commission, Annexes to the Standard Eurobarometers no. 60-90, Chapter on confidence in the 
justice system for the period 2004-2017, accessed April 3, 2020, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/General/index. 
 
 
Table no. 3. Situation on solving requests for conditional release in the period 2000-2018 
Year 
Inmates 
evaluated 
by the 
conditional 
release 
committees 
Inmates 
proposed for 
early release 
by the 
committees  
Proposals 
admitted by 
the courts 
Proposal
s rejected 
by the 
courts 
Proposals 
postponed 
by the 
courts 
Concordance 
between 
committee 
proposals and 
court decisions 
(Admission of 
requests) (%) 
Inmates 
who have 
appealed 
the 
decisions of 
conditional 
release 
committees 
Appeals 
admitted 
by the 
courts 
Appeals 
rejected 
by the 
courts 
Appeals 
postponed 
by the 
courts 
Concordance 
between 
committee 
proposals and 
court decisions 
(Rejection and 
postponement 
of appeals) 
(%) 
Total number 
of persons 
conditionally 
released 
No. of 
requests 
made to 
the 
courts 
Requests 
admitted 
by the 
courts 
2000 34.964 20.999 18.370 0 2.069 87,48 13.965 10.400 0 2.789 25,53 28.663 * * 
2001 30.849 18.239 15.634 0 2.188 85,72 12.610 9,450 0 2.585 25,06 25.512 * 428 
2002 27.553 15.098 12.946 0 1.882 85,75 12.455 9.544 0 2.568 23,37 22.822 * 404 
2003 25.752 13.174 11.036 0 1.871 83,77 12.578 9.671 0 2.574 23,11 21.025 * 318 
2004 22.518 10.688 9.218 177 1.312 86,25 11.815 9.111 245 2.463 22,89 18.647 2.667 306 
2005 18.807 9.046 7.630 196 1.220 84,35 9.961 7.732 287 1.951 22,38 15.587 2.176 387 
2006 17.813 8.634 7.147 222 1.265 82,78 9.179 6.902 280 1.997 24,81 14.451 2.398 490 
2007 17.724 8.353 6.470 197 1.686 77,46 9.371 6.497 215 2.659 30,67 13.344 2.613 499 
2008 15.819 7.154 5.172 199 1.783 72,30 8.665 5.580 347 2.738 35,60 11.256 2.774 501 
2009 14.269 6.507 4.225 337 1.945 64,93 7.762 4.285 438 3.039 44,80 8.914 3.459 510 
2010 13.850 6.197 3.871 285 2.041 62,47 7.653 3.726 396 3.531 51,31 8.420 3.666 444 
2011 15.404 6.986 4.139 477 2.370 59,25 8.418 3.911 479 4.028 53,54 9.212 3.995 677 
2012 17.969 8.046 4.766 681 2.599 59,23 9.923 4.367 777 4.779 55,99 10.229 4.736 469 
2013 19.794 8.874 4.808 872 3.194 54,18 10.920 4.343 915 5.662 60,23 10.362 5.648 665 
2014 22.566 10.962 5.687 1.107 4.168 51,88 11.604 4.716 895 5.993 59,36 11.392 6.839 740 
2015 21.462 10.593 5.155 1.124 4.314 48,66 10.869 3.970 1.102 5.797 63,47 10.920 6.550 789 
2016 20.028 108.637 4.692 1.440 4.505 44,11 9.391 3.289 1.138 4.964 64,98 9.216 5.931 955 
2017 23.969 12.640 - - - - - - - - - 10.554 - - 
2018 20.394 9.610 - - - - - - - - - 8.859 - - 
Source: Statistics parsed from data received from the National Administration of Penitentiaries in answer to requests no. 200254/27.10.2017 and 
500025/29.01.2019. 
 
Table no.  4. The situation of inmates on conditional release in the period 2000-2019 
No. Name of 
paroled 
offender 
Professional or 
political situation 
Nature of the 
offense 
Sentence Sentence 
served 
Amount of 
prejudice in 
EURO 
Fraction of 
the sentence 
served 
 
1 
 
Adrian Nastase 
Prime Minister, 
President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, president of the 
PSD/PDSR 
Abuse of authority, 
 
bribery, blackmail, 
2 years 
 
4 years and 6 
months 
8 months 
 
1 year and 6 
months 
1.750.000 
 
630.000 
1/3 
 
1/3 
 
2. 
 
Dan Voiculescu 
Member of the Senate, 
businessman, founder 
of the Intact Media 
group, president of 
PUR/PC 
 
Money laundering 
 
10 years 
 
2 years and 
11 months 
 
60.000.000 
 
< 1/3 
 
 
3. 
 
 
Adrian Severin 
Member of the 
European Parliament, 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies 
(FSN/PD/PSD) 
 
 
Bribery, influence 
peddling 
 
 
4 years 
 
 
1 year and 3 
months 
 
 
430.000 
 
 
< 1/3 
 
4. 
 
Miron Mitrea 
Transport Minister, 
Member of Parliament 
(PDSR/PSD) 
 
Bribery 
 
2 years 
 
1 year and 3 
months 
 
73.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
5. 
 
Gabriel Sandu 
Minister of 
communications and 
information 
technology, Member of 
the Chamber of 
Deputies (PNL) 
 
Bribery, money 
laundering 
 
3 years 
 
1 year and 1 
month 
 
51.400.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
6. 
 
Relu Fenechiu 
Transportation and 
Infrastructure Minister, 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies 
(PNL) 
Complicity in 
aggravated abuse of 
power, repeated 
influence peddling 
and money 
laundering 
 
5 years and 6 
months 
 
3 years and 6 
months 
 
1.300.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
7. 
 
Stelian Fuia 
Minister for 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Member 
of the Chamber of 
Deputies, President of 
the PNL Călărași 
branch 
 
Abuse of power 
 
3 years 
 
1 year and 7 
months 
 
360.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
8. 
 
Codruț Sereș 
 
Economy Minister, 
Member of the Senate, 
member of the PC 
Joint transnational 
criminal enterprise, 
treason by divulging 
information of 
confidential nature 
 
6 years 
 
2 years and 9 
months 
 
147.700.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
9. 
 
Zsolt Nagy 
 
Minister of 
communications and 
information 
technology, UDMR 
member 
Joint transnational 
criminal enterprise, 
treason by divulging 
information of 
confidential nature 
 
4 years 
 
2 years and 9 
months 
 
- 
 
> 1/3 
 
 
 
10. 
 
 
 
Sorin Pantiș 
 
 
Minister of 
Communications, 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
managing director 
Grivco SA București, 
PNL member 
The deliberate 
establishing of a 
reduces value, 
compared to the real 
market value, of 
assets belonging to 
economic agents in 
which the state is a 
shareholder, 
committed during 
privatization activity, 
forgery of documents 
under private 
signature 
 
 
 
7 years 
 
 
 
4 years 
 
 
 
60.000.000 
 
 
 
 
 
> 1/3 
 
 
11. 
 
 
Gabriel Berca 
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, head of the 
General Secretariat of 
the Government, 
prefect of Bacau 
county, PNL/PSD 
member 
 
 
Influence peddling 
 
 
2 years 
 
 
1 year 
 
 
92.500 
 
 
> 1/3 
 
12. 
 
George Copos 
Vice-Prime Minister, 
businessman, Member 
of the Senate, member 
of the PC 
 
Partaking in illegal 
transactions 
 
4 years 
 
1 year and 1 
month 
 
900.000 
 
< 1/3 
 
 
13. 
 
 
Ionel Manțog 
Secretary of State 
within the Ministry of 
Economy, county 
counselor, general 
director of the Turceni 
Energy Complex, PDL 
member 
 
Abuse of power 
pertaining to the 
misuse of sensitive 
information 
 
 
5 years 
 
 
3 years 
 
 
92.000 
 
 
> 1/3 
 
14. 
 
Nicolae Mischie 
Member of Parliament, 
head of the Gorj 
County Council, PSD 
member 
 
Bribery, influence 
peddling 
 
4 years 
 
1 year and 2 
months 
 
72.000 
 
< 1/3 
15. Cătălin Voicu Member of Parliament, 
PSD member 
Influence peddling 7 years 2 years and 7 
months 
225.000 > 1/3 
16. Mihai Banu Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
PNL/PDL member 
Influence peddling 3 years and 6 
months 
1 year and 2 
months 
92.500 1/3 
 
17. 
 
George Becali 
Member of the 
European Parliament, 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
businessman, member 
of PNG-CD, PRM, PNL 
 
Bribery, forgery, 
unlawful deprivation of 
liberty 
 
3 years and 6 
months 
 
1 year and 10 
months 
 
1.700.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
18. 
 
Nati Meir 
 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
PRM member 
Fraud, influence 
peddling 
 
Fraud 
10 years 
 
4 years 
5 years 
 
1 year and 1 
month 
1.600.000 
 
115.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
< 1/3 
 
 
19. 
 
 
Alin Trășculescu 
 
 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
PDL member 
Influence peddling, 
embezzelement, use of 
false, instigation to use 
of forged documents 
under private signature, 
instigation to money 
laundering 
 
 
3 years 
 
 
1 year and 8 
months 
 
 
200.000 
 
 
> 1/3 
 
20. 
 
Florin Popescu 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
President of the 
Dâmbovița County 
Council, PNL/PDL/PMP 
member 
Official misconduct in 
a position of auhtority, 
with the aim of 
securing undue benefits 
 
2 years 
 
1 year and 4 
months 
 
110.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
21. 
 
Ion Stan 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
Secretary of the Control 
Commission of the 
SRI, PSD member 
 
Influence peddling 
 
2 years 
 
10 months 
 
30.000 
 
> 1/3 
22. Dan Păsat Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
PDL/PNL member 
Violent blackmail 3 years 1 year and 7 
months 
- > 1/3 
23. Nicolae 
Vasilescu 
Member of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 
PRM/PSD member 
Influence peddling 2 years 1 year and 6 
months 
450.000 > 1/3 
 
24. 
 
Gheorghe Ștefan 
 
Piata Neamt mayor, 
PDL member 
Bribery (Microsoft 
corruption scandal), 
money laundering, 
carrying out financial 
operations 
incompatible with the 
position held 
3 years and 6 
months 
 
3 years and 9 
months 
1 year and 2 
months 
 
 
4 months 
3.000.000 
 
 
226.000 
1/3 
 
 
< 1/3 
25. Antonie Solomon Craiova mayor, 
Member of the Senate, 
PSD/PDL member 
Bribery  
3 years 
 
1 year and 3 
months 
 
50.000 
 
> 1/3 
26. Romeo 
Stavarache 
Bacau mayor, 
PUR/PNL member 
Bribery 4 years 2 years and 3 
months 
500.000 > 1/3 
 
27. 
 
Dan Diaconescu 
TV anchor, founder of 
the OTV and DDTV 
channels, founder 
president of the PP-DD 
party 
 
Blackmail 
 
5 years and 6 
months 
 
2 years and 8 
months 
 
- 
 
> 1/3 
 
28. 
 
Sorin Roșca 
Stănescu 
 
Journalist, director of 
the Ziua newspaper, 
PNL member 
Utilisation of inside 
information that are not 
meant for publicity and 
setting up an organized 
criminal group 
 
2 years and 
4months 
 
9 months 
 
- 
 
1/3 
29. Nicolae Popa Businessman FNI scam 10 years and 4 
months 
3 years and 2 
months 
1.200.000 < 1/3 
 
30. 
 
Mircea Băsescu 
Businessman, brother 
to former President of 
Romania Traian 
Băsescu 
 
Influence peddling 
 
4 years 
 
1 year and 3 
months 
 
265.000 
 
< 1/3 
31. Ioan Niculae Businessman Forgery of 
documents under 
private signature 
2 years and 7 
months 
1 year and 3 
months 
150.000 > 1/3 
 
 
32. 
 
 
Dorin Cocoş 
Businessman, ex-
husband to politician 
Elena Udrea, in close 
relation with the former 
President of Romania 
Traian Băsescu 
 
 
Influence peddling 
and money 
laundering 
 
 
2 years and 4 
months 
 
 
1 years 
 
 
9.000.000 
 
 
> 1/3 
 
33. 
 
Sorin Ovidiu 
Vîntu 
Businessman, owner of 
media conglomerate 
Realitatea-Cațavencu, 
 
Aiding and abetting 
 
2 years 
 
10 months 
 
- 
 
> 1/3 
 
34. 
Sandu Anghel 
(also known as 
Bercea 
Mondialul) 
 
Mob boss 
Aggravated 
attempted murder, 
tax evasion, money 
laundering 
 
8 years and 9 
months 
 
6 years and 2 
months 
 
800.000 
 
> 1/3 
 
35. 
 
Ion Balint (also 
known as Nuțu 
Cămătaru) 
 
 
Mob boss 
Racketeering, loan 
sharking, unlawful 
ownership or port of 
weapons, homicide 
 
5 years and 11 
months 
 
1 year and 4 
months 
 
- 
 
< 1/3 
 
36. 
 
Gregorian 
Bivolaru 
Spiritual teacher, 
founder of the 
Movement for Spiritual 
Integration into the 
Absolute (MISA) 
 
Statutory rape and 
sexual acts with a 
minor 
 
6 years 
 
1 year and 7 
months 
 
- 
 
< 1/3 
 Total   170 years 73 years and 
one month 
284.513.000 
 
> 1/3 
Source: Data centralized according to information available in the media. 
